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Any account of education, it is believed, has to do with and aims at personal well-being.   I approach this view on well-being not in a positive but in a negative way.   I put forward some items that in certain circumstances can be taken by and called sources or forms of disorder.  In the absence of such forms or sources of disorder, I assume that a certain order, prudential or moral, takes place and that constitutes the well-being of the person.    The concept of ‘absence of disorder’ is introduced and argued as an educationally appropriate view of personal well-being which is the central educational aim. Therefore, ‘absence of disorder’ is positioned as the central aim of education.    This concept is illuminated, for practical reasoning, by a list of seven possible forms of disorder: Comparison, Corruption, Dependency, Division, Fear, Self-disintegration and Violence.    
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As a view of personal well-being, ‘absence of disorder’ is supported by the Levinasinian concept of ‘disinterest’ as a root for ‘what is to be a human’.   Such ‘disinterest’ is related to the concepts of love and of ‘action for its own sake’. Even if only to some extent successful, the argument is directed to the following conclusion: an education aiming at ‘absence of disorder’ may sustain the ethical environment to promote prudential well-being and give us some confidence in simultaneously favouring moral education through love. The common school ethos, with emphasis in items like grades and rewards, is perceived as being permeated by many forms of disorder.
The main purpose of the paper is to explore the conceptualisation of what will be referred to from now on as ‘absence of disorder’, as an adequate view of the well–being of the person and its implications for education.  This adequacy is equated with the extent to which the concept of absence of disorder can shed light on the aims of education and some of its fundamental problems.  Absence of disorder will then have to be judged both for its simplicity and its explanatory capacity.   This way absence of disorder is constituted, as the highest value to which education should aim.  This is justified by taking a view of the autonomous ethical person as the most important outcome of the process of education. 
 For practical reasoning, absence of disorder is explained, and seen mainly on psychological grounds, through seven main forms of disorder and respective sub-items, as follows:  Comparison in itself and as expressed in competition, envy, jealousy, vanity, prestige, inferior and superior relationships (winner and loser, successful and unsuccessful), physical and intellectual capacities; Corruption of intention and material; Dependency of, substances, persons, objects, organizations and traditions; Division by ‘race’, nationalities, regional ties, languages, professions, social class, religions, gender, sexual orientation and ethnical tribalism, able and disabled persons, old and young persons;  Fear of death, violence, the unknown, comparison, authority, public opinion, failure, humiliation, shame etc.;    self-disintegration of mind and body through lack of health, food, shelter and clothing; Violence by, indifference, domination, power, exploitation, greed, anger, punishment,  humiliation, shame, blackmail, vindictiveness  and physical aggression.   
       Any such a list, I believe, must be seen as not exhaustive, not hierarchical and certainly not final. Well-being will be, according to this view, seen as a certain complex positive state that at a personal level emerges from the absence of the sources of disorder.   I don’t attempt to make any effort to describe such positive state of well-being.   What I will attempt to do is to describe briefly the forms of disorder, seen as the major disturbing factors of personal well-being, at a negative level. On the other hand, the items in the list of forms of disorder are themselves seen as ambiguous and complex. A certain item may be or may be not a form of disorder, depending on the particularities of the real situation. Such assessment of the context must be seen within the complexities of practical reasoning. The common schools are perceived as being permeated by many of the forms of disorder and, for example, override by intense fear, comparison and competition. 
        Finally I claim here that being in absence of disorder may have as a general result an important absence: a state of absence of interest. Or, put more directly, an absence of overriding opportunistic interests. Social practices imply a complex array of interrelated interests. Such freedom from overriding opportunistic interests, I claim, allows engaging in a special kind of ‘action for its own sake’.  This I see as the kind of ‘action for its own sake’ that conveys goodness. With Levinas, I take the view that at the root of the condition of what it is to be a human – previous to the intentionality of the conatus - there is a ‘secret’. That ‘secret’ is ‘disinterestedness’, here correlated with love. This requires the need for an adequate formulation of an educational love. Then perhaps we can say that an education aiming at absence of disorder may be in greater harmony with such view of the ‘self’, and promote the moral as well as the prudent through love.
	 
 II – Absence of Disorder as the Aim of Education

The question ‘what is education and the educated person?’ remains an open one.   Even in the context of liberalism and liberal education, the clear demarcation of these concepts and therefore the educational aims that go along with them has not yet generated a consensus (White, 1999:195).  On the other hand, discussing the aims of education is to discuss the concept of education itself (Barrow, 1999:16) since the aims are recognized to be intrinsic to it (Peters, 1966).   That is to say:  the concept of education can be defined through the identification and clarification of its aims.   
It seems important then to elucidate, even if briefly, the concept of aims. Colin Wringe (1988: 6-9) makes it clear that aims are not ideals or objectives.  The idealist is here seen as an impractical dreamer.  So in this sense, aims of education should not be idealistic statements with very good intentions which are of little or no practical value.  On the other hand, objectives concern specific targets to be attained in a certain amount of time.  Normally objectives are not formulations of mere intentions, but are stated in preferably quantifiable elements so that their control can be measurable through time.  Aims of education can be seen as in between those merely idealistic statements on the one hand and the crude time planned objectives on the other.  Aims should be stated in such a way as to highlight the ultimate purpose of education.  They should give us a sense of what is fundamental thereby providing guidance as a beacon.  The central aim of education is therefore seen as a fundamental statement that incorporates the answer to the question – what is education?  
           As an example of a ‘knowledge-unrelated view’, the progressive conception of education is characterized more closely by Paul Standish (1999) when contrasting it with the liberal one, by reference to three aims of education provided by more common analyses:  ‘…first, to serve the needs of society; second, to pass on and develop those ways of knowing and understanding which are the common heritage; third, to help individual learners to develop, either through a process of unfolding from within or through an authentic creation of themselves (ibid: 35).  The ‘child-centred’ movement was a reaction to a traditional authoritarian education ‘…commonly characterized in terms of formal methods of instruction and an authoritarian pedagogy, with the belief that education is primarily concern with the passing on of facts and skills’ (ibid: 36).   At first sight the liberal and progressive positions can be aligned with the second and third aims, Standish underlines that both are concerned with freeing the learner, rejecting an education that is primarily instrumental .   Indeed progressivism focused   more on the prescription of procedures and less on the content or the materials to be transmitted between teachers and learners.  Counter arguments in this debate in favour of the progressive view can be found in John Darling (1982) as well as a more detailed characterization of the nuances in the positions of figures of this movement: Rousseau keeping a more indirect control of the learner, the more recent views of A.S. Neil and Carl Rogers influenced by psychotherapy, Pestalozzi and Froebel.  
       But most interestingly as another ‘knowledge-unrelated view’, one can take the one presented by Paul Standish seeing the concept of education as complex and non-definable.  He pictures education as centred in the good and this as ‘unsayable other than in opaque, negative and oblique ways’ (Standish, 1999: 47). This view is coincident with the position I am favouring here, in relation to the use of the negative approach. It is in this via negativa that the “absence of the forms of disorder” can be pictured as the aim of education.
         I am not at all suggesting that we can live without instrumental knowledge and schools should not teach it. What I am asserting is that such a process is a pedagogical process that should not in any way override the more complex and important aspects of the educational process.   Further the views of education as a complex composite of values, knowledge and skills, accepted and imposed instrumental knowledge by definition. The problem is that because the acquisition of instrumental knowledge is relatively easy, in comparison with character formation (correct inner dispositions), it overrides the concern with the latter. My claim is that a substantive direction for good character formation is possible via the analysis of the presence or absence of the seven sources or forms of disorder.  To a brief description of these I turn now in the next section.  


III –The Forms of Disorder and Schools

Now let’s look at the sources of disorder and the schooling system as one important aspect of society.    Not only my generation but also generations before and after mine have gone through the compulsory schooling system. We did that from a very early age in a most intensive way.   We sat in classrooms for thousands of hours.  We lived always with grading systems as ever-present systems of comparison between students.     We went through hundreds of tests, exams and different ways of assessments racing through time and nervously looking frequently at our watches. We saw the best ones being praised and admired and eventually we envied them.    Countless times we sacrificed and committed ourselves in studying a subject not for the sake of that subject but for the sake of progressing to the next stage and sometimes for the sake of prizes. We went into numerous classes in fear of saying the wrong thing (and also sometimes, the right thing), of being humiliated, by professors and peers alike.  
The fear of failing has been continuously with us.    Some of us even lived through days of physical punishment in schools. We all lived through the possibility of psychological punishment and humiliation privately or, much worse than that, in front of the class.    We all had countless tedious home-work that killed the joy of our leisure.   We were told that if we did not succeed in studies we would be losers and nobodies.    We felt a certain power operating around us.   Such power was an unquestioned power from which we could not escape.  Living these situations and many others in complex subtle intertwining ways and with different degrees of intensity is and was for the great majority of us the norm.    We are therefore ‘normalised’ people in dealing with them and accepting them.  Therefore detaching us completely from this picture is very difficult.    The difficulty is to approach something that, in general, vanished a long time ago and hardly was tasted by all of those who went through, for example, a school system or a work place in these late modern societies. This basic picture seems to persist in today’s common schools, permeated by many aspects of the forms of disorder as here briefly described.    
 Comparison is the root operation that may develop into the forms of disorder listed as its sub-items: competition, envy, jealousy, vanity, prestige, inferior and superior relationships (winner and loser, successful and unsuccessful), physical and intellectual capacities.   Since we have different talents the question of equality is an elusive one.   Instead, the burning issue is comparison and its developments.   But in itself, comparison is also an important form of disorder deserving the close attention of philosophers. David Hume devoted considerable attention to comparison as a negative trait of human character. Annete Baier writes that Hume’s ‘principle of comparison’ is among the two ‘ … fairly sharp good/bad contrasts he draws among the forces affecting motivation and affecting character …’, and ‘makes us wish to fare better then others, so blocks sympathy, giving us, on the contrary, pleasure in another’s pain and pain from their pleasure.’  (Baier, 1998: 232).     
In his ‘Treatise of Human Nature’, Hume contrasts two principles. The first principle is the principle of sympathy.    The second principle is the principle of comparison.    These principles are in opposition.    Concerning the principle of comparison, Hume mentions that we judge more objects by comparison than by their intrinsic value, but the more obvious comparison that we do is amongst ourselves (Hume, 1992: 593).   For Hume this all-encompassing operation of comparison mixes with most of our passions (Ibid.).    On comparison among human beings, Hume writes:

 ‘In all kinds of comparison an object makes us always receive from another, to which it is compar’d, a sensation contrary to what arises from it self in its direct and immediate survey. The direct survey of another’s pleasure naturally gives us pleasure; and therefore produces pain, when compar’d with our own. His pain, consider’d in it self, is painful; but augments the idea of our own happiness, and gives us pleasure’ (Hume, 1992: 594).  

I take it that engaging in comparison is an almost inevitable trait for anyone living in relationship with others.    Many times such comparison will find justification and is serving moral principles, virtuous intentions and pursuits.   How could the end of slavery and the general movement of defence of human rights take place without comparison?   How could I protect my rights and urge the scope of such rights if I was not to make comparisons?    Certainly I have to engage in comparison with how others are faring and the conditions underlying their situation, and ask myself how would I fare under similar conditions.   It seems that the concept of justice itself would be hard to grasp and apply, without the intervention of comparison.  This is not the outcome of comparison that concerns Hume.    What so sharply concerns Hume is the outcome of comparison that blocks sympathy in an unreasonable way.    As noted above by Baier, and as we can directly infer from Hume’s own words, what concerned him was the outcome of comparison that consists in non-moral dispositions that corrupt the virtues and inflame passions.    Such dispositions cause pain when the others experience some improvement and ‘pleasure’ when on the contrary they become worse or suffer a setback.  
The second form of disorder is corruption and can be exemplified looking at the practice in the classroom which consists in distinguishing children with ‘stars’ in reward for what is understood as some sort of good behaviour.    As usual, at the base there is comparison.   The children not rewarded either behaved ‘badly’ or were by default considered not eligible for the stars – a sort of neutral indifference or negative punishment.    Eventually they are invited to take the example of the colleague if they want to gain a star and be also flattered.    These children are invited to good behaviour as the basis for reward.    Not for the sake of good behaviour itself, but for the sake of a star.    In other words, the message given to the children can also be read as follows: if it’s not for the sake of a star, good behaviour is not worth it.   Or, in another more general way, the message is also: one should only strive or aim at something if there is some sort of reward at the end.    
Children not rewarded by the star will eventually feel disappointment and bitterness, and these emotional states can escalate to envy of the colleague who was praised.   They can eventually feel fear or anxiety at the prospect of not achieving the goal due to external reasons or due to lack of confidence in themselves. After all not all children can be praised and flattered because that would render the system meaningless. The child that received the star and the flattering may also be passing through a complex emotional state. She may feel joy but also fear or apprehension for having to keep up with the responsibility of being a special student.   She may also feel superiority towards her colleagues – the experience of first podiums.    But one thing she is led to learn, is that in the end of good behaviour there is a reward that is extrinsic.    This I take to be a great start for children to learn how to behave in a corrupt way.   It is a way to get children into corruption as a natural way of living.   It is an accepted and cultivated way into corruption, as a complement of the ever-present grading system. Reward and punishment, even if by default, together with extrinsic motivation, are the key words here.   
Dependency of, substances, persons, objects, organizations and traditions, is the third form of disorder. Irrational psychological attachment or affiliation is what I think we should avoid in our relationships. Rational criticism is buried in an attachment that is more of the emotional kind.   In my relations with persons, traditions, objects, organizations, or involvement in taking substances, irrational psychological attachment and affiliation is what we have to look for.   As usual, particularly in what concerns personal relationships, things are very complex and seem to be in need of further clarification.    Of course there is the beauty of certain attachments between persons that correlate with love.    Maybe we have here some of the most gratifying things in life itself.   However these should not be placed side by side with, for example, obsessive compulsions of one person towards the other.
As the fourth form of disorder comes division and someone wrote that the ways by which people divide themselves are endless. Opportunities to division can be by ‘race’, nationalities, regional ties, languages, professions, social class, religions, gender, sexual orientation, ethnical tribalism, able and disabled persons, old and young persons. I claim that ‘illusion’ might be a crucial feature underlying all the forms of disorders that I listed under division.    Certainly we can devise many ideas that are socially constructed.   But I consider that these ideas underlying division are part of the imaginary that we should put under the designation of ‘illusion’. This is so because such images deceive and alienate from reality.    Since it is so, it is one mission of education to help us to drop such illusions.  Students may feel this psychological division, for example, when segmented in ‘winners’ and ‘losers’.
The fifth form of disorder is fear, as a psychological disturbance, of death, violence, the unknown, comparison, authority, public opinion, failure, humiliation, shame etc.; is one of the forms of disorder with a long tradition in the classroom, assuming many different patterns and leaving behind deep marks.    Fear can be useful in life preservation, but as a form of disorder can come in countless mixes of variety and intensity.    Intense irrational fear can be designated as a phobia.   The list of common phobias can easily contain tens of items.    In schools, fear can be connected with the peer group, class, and family – bullying, fear of shame, and fear of difference (namely achieving under or above the average), fear of authority, of failure, of public opinion, of saying the wrong thing, of violence from family, etc. Fear may be seen as a pain that anticipates another pain.  
The sixth form of disorder is self-disintegration of mind and body through lack of health, food, shelter and clothing, is the form of disorder that deals with the mind-body issues.  The designation self-disintegration of mind and body is intended to acknowledge not only the distress arising by lack of essential goods like food, shelter and clothing. It is intended most of all to acknowledge psychological disorders like depression and anxiety, unfortunately so common these days.  
 Finally, the seventh form of disorder is violence, by indifference , domination, power, exploitation, greed, anger, punishment, humiliation, blackmail, vindictiveness, and physical aggression, in its diverse forms and with its psychological damages permeates societies and schools.   In a certain sense any form of disorder seems to imply a certain violence – it seems that, for example, for a Buddhist, the end of disorder is seen as the end of all violence.  As pointed by Colin Wringe (1988: 15), in the classroom, violence can be easily present by ‘humiliating penalties’. 


IV – An Educational Love for Absence of Disorder

As said, experiencing the forms of disorder in complex subtle intertwining ways and with different degrees of intensity is and was for the great majority of us the norm, damaging our education as emotionality. Education was seen as the learning process of living the good life as the life in well-being, sustaining the educational ethical environment by preserving it as much as possible from the forms of disorder. The goal is the educated person seen as the autonomous ethical person with a preserved natural emotionality with the capability to love. Thus love is posited as flourishing in the absence of disorder and, at the same time, is seen as a contributor to educate the person. Therefore, even if briefly, it is important to try to illuminate such educational love as the aim of education. 
I start to take the view, drawing on extensive works like those of Peter Singer, that love may be seen as a giving in disinterest, an action for its own sake, directed to the good of its object. And this concept of ‘giving’ is an important concept paid attention to by Simone Weil,  ‘Of the links between God and man love is the greatest’, and she continues: ‘God gives himself to men either as powerful or as perfect – it is for them to choose.’ (Weil 2004: 90, 91).  For Weil, the need to receive a reward equivalent to what was given disturbs the necessary ‘void or vacuum’ required for the ‘supernatural reward’ to occur.  This implies that whatever the dynamics of give-and-take in the relationship may be, it has to be transcended. This going beyond the give-and-take, happens in a state of disinterestedness. Such disinterestedness is also a ‘void’ or absence of opportunistic interests.  But most importantly, how does such a supernatural event come about?    
To this, she writes: ‘Man only escapes from the laws of the world in lightning flashes. Instants when everything stands still, instants of contemplation, of pure intuition, of mental void, of acceptance of the moral void. It is through such instants that he is capable of the supernatural’ (Ibid. 10-1). These ‘lightning flashes’ are not permanent states or continuants, but non-volitional occurrences, since they bring about selflessness by ‘pure intuition’. This selflessness is implicated in the ‘mental void’, a disinterest that is capable of the ‘supernatural’ or the transcendental of active love.
Also underpinning the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas seems to be a conception of ‘disinterestedness’ that recurs throughout his work.  For example he discusses disinterest as a ‘Desire without end, from beyond Being: dis-interestedness , transcendence – desire for the Good’.  Later he implies that love can happen only through the idea of ‘infinite’.   For Levinas time is primarily posited not as the death of being, but as the relation with ‘infinity’ that transcends time (Levinas, 2000: 19).   But ‘transcendence to the point of absence’ as disinterestedness to be possible as ‘Desire for the Infinite’, the ‘Desirable or God, must remain separated in the Desire’ (Levinas, 1998: 67-69).  The good as a motivating thought, as in Weil, cannot be a corrupter of the action just for the sake of the object of that action. Then the good happens through a movement going beyond being as ‘… aspiration to a wisdom, that is not knowledge, that is love (Levinas, 1999: 8).  
Thus the primordial role of intentionality is questioned. The ontological meaning of affection being not in anxiety, we do not have ‘to maintain that intentionality is the ultimate secret of the psyche’ (Ibid. 18).  Levinas refers to the concept of ‘to give’ as being the point at which we present the face to the Other and make ourselves responsible for him and available by saying ‘here I am’. More specifically, he mentions gratuity ‘as the absolute distraction of a game without trace or memory’ (Levinas, 2000: 179), underlining forgetfulness or absence of memory. Levinas asserts that: ‘Intentionality is not the secret of the human. The human esse, or existing, is not a conatus but disinterestedness and adieu ’  (Ibid. 15). 
Weil also implicitly focuses on absence of memory or forgetfulness: ‘Thus in love there is chastity or the lack of chastity according to whether the desire is or is not directed towards the future’ (Weil, 2004: 66). What is it for love to be ‘chaste’? Love is ‘chaste’ when the desire that carries goodness ends completely and forever with the action for its own sake, when there is no possibility whatsoever, of future claims. Finally perhaps we can formulate educational love as a giving for the good of the object that when in disinterest we chastely forget that we gave, or we remain in noble remembrance. For example, is the students “love” for English classes the result of a disinterested concern of the student for the subject matter or just an interest in school rewards?
However, education aiming at a meaningful life in well-being has the duty of being alert.  Education should be vividly aware that, as asserted by Levinas (2006: 97-8): 

‘There is in man the possibility of not awakening to the other; there is the possibility of evil. Evil is the order of being pure and simple – and, on the contrary, to go towards the other is the penetration of the human into being, an “otherwise than being”. I am not at all certain that the “otherwise than being” can triumph’. 
How can then education be said to triumph? With unpredictable results and starting from non-volitional love, originating in a ‘void’ or an ‘absence’, what is left for education to do? What is education responsibility? 
Perhaps what is left for education is to look for what has to be ‘absent’: that education can look into the sources or forms of disorder that may disturb active love, in order to avoid or mitigate them. This can be seen as a creative process, even when accompanied by the unavoidable nobility of error or imperfection.  This process brings into being the beauty of education as a miraculous process, having in mind that: ‘The miracle of creation lies in creating a moral being’ (Levinas, 2003: 89). This moral being can then be understood as the miraculous creation of an education through love and aiming at love. 
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